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The Role of the Courts in Settling
Disputes between the Society and
the Government in China
Robert Heuser
1 In the 1990s, the courts, in dealing with administrative cases, reinforced their function
of  helping  to  stabilise  the  economic  reforms  by  consequently  reviewing  cases
concerning infringements of business-autonomy 
2 One of the new features in Chinese society brought about by the reform process are the
methods of making complaints and settling conflicts. The old ways have by no means
disappeared1,  but  new  mechanisms  have  been  added  and  are  becoming  more
prominent. This relates not only to commercial or civil disputes but also to disputes
between citizens or firms on the one hand, and governmental agencies on the other.
3 That the law courts are involved in resolving these types of dispute is one of the more
surprising phenomena in China today. Not that the people would sue the government
in any exaggerated manner: of the around six million cases that the Chinese courts
have had to deal  with in the last  year,  only 2% were related to a  conflict  between
citizens and administrative agencies.2 However, the access of persons aggrieved by an
administrative decision to the courts has enriched Chinese legal culture with a new
ingredient: the traditional and seemingly unchangeable guan guan min (that the officials
govern the people) has been supplemented by an attempt, as feeble as it may be, to min
gao guan (to let the people sue the officials)3.
4 From the very beginning of the conceiving of a system of administrative litigation, the
idea of social stability had been pre-eminent. One scholar writing in 1987 ascribed to
administrative litigation two functions, both contributing to social stability:
5 –  By  applying  proper  legal  procedures  to  the request  of  a  person aggrieved by  an
administrative decision, the courts may dissipate resentment and discontent through
providing more effective remedies than the traditional way of shangfang or laifang-laixin
(making complaints and appeals for help by the higher authorities by making visits or
sending  letters).  In  other  words:  The  frustration  reflected  in  the  saying  that  “for
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officials  to sue the people is  just  and normal,  but there is  no effective way for the
people to sue the officials” (guan gao min yige zhun, min gao guan meiyou men) could be
reduced;
6 – by reviewing and correcting illegal activities of the state agencies by a specialised
device outside of the administration the courts may achieve unity of the administrative
legal system and protect administrative efficiency.4
7 After  a  few  years  of  limited  experimentation  the  breakthrough  for  administrative
litigation came in 1987 when the Law on Administrative Penalties for Public Security
went  into  force.  Since  police  detention  and  especially  police-imposed  fines  are
widespread, the provision in this law that a person punished who does not agree to this
decision  is  entitled  to  bring  a  lawsuit  (art.  39),  opened  the  way  to  judicial  review
concerning  the  decisions  of  that  administrative  agency  most  closely  related  to  the
everyday life of the people. Still  today, “min keyi gao guan” to a great extent means
suing the police for illegally imposing administrative sanctions.
8 The  importance  the  Chinese  leadership  did  ascribe  to  administrative  litigation  is
reflected in the fact that in the legislative history of the PRC it was only the third time
that a draft law was published for the general public: the drafts of the 1954 and 1982
constitutions,  and in November 1988 the draft  of  the Administrative Litigation Law
(ALL). When the law was finally promulgated in 1989 and went into force in October
1990  the  scope  of  the  courts’  jurisdiction  in  administrative  matters  broadened
considerably, and succeeding “Interpretations” of the Supreme Court in 1991 and 1999
continued to further open the gate to the courts. In the following I will first summarise
the basic structure or features of the system of administrative litigation as based on the
law of 1989 and the Supreme Court interpretations, then deal with the main types of
conflicts involved, and finally summarise achievements and problems of the role of the
courts in settling administrative disputes.
Scope of administrative litigation
9 The central notion of any system of administrative litigation is the scope of appeal or
the scope of the jurisdiction of the courts. The legislator has to answer the question:
Who may sue which administrative decision? In continental European countries like
France and Germany “access to the administrative courts is accorded in all public law
disputes  ...”  (art.  40  I  German Law on Administrative  Courts),  thus, to  all  disputes
between citizens and the government, as long as the plaintiff claims that the contested
administrative act unlawfully infringes his or her rights (art. 113 I). Such a “general
clause” has not been established by the Chinese ALL. Instead it takes the approach to
single out for review only certain types of “concrete administrative acts” (juti xingzheng
xingwei),  “concrete” means that the administrative act  is  directed against  a specific
person  outside  the  administration.  These  reviewable  administrative  acts  are
enumerated in art. 11, sect. 1 of the ALL; section 2 provides in a catch-all clause that
other laws may allow for further types of concrete administrative acts to be sued in the
courts.  The  enumeration  contains  the  following  types  which  also  may  be  said  to
represent the types of conflicts between society and government which are reviewable
in the courts: 
10 Administrative  penalties (xingzheng  chufa )  such  as  detention,  fines,  revocation  of
licences or an order to suspend production or business activities; 
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11 administrative compulsory measures (xingzheng qiangzhi cuoshi) as restricting personal
freedom (as shelter for investigation) or the movement of property (as sealing up or
freezing of property); 
12 administrative  acts  infringing  lawful  business  autonomy  (jingying  zizhuquan),
permitting  suits  against  agencies  illegally  interfering  in  enterprise  operations  and
management; 
13 administrative acts denying licences or permits, as e.g. denials of business operating
licences; 
14 refusal  by  an  administrative  organ  to  perform  its  statutory  duties,  as  to  protect
personal or property rights; 
15 failure to properly pay pensions; 
16 requests by administrative authorities to perform certain obligations to be in breach of
the law, which means that all duties imposed must have a legal basis.
17 According  to  the  catch-all  clause  of  art.  11,  sect.  2  the  courts  “may  hear  other
administrative cases as provided for by law.” The only example I could find in this
regard  are  the  rules  concerning  notaries  promulgated  by  the  Sichuan  People’s
Congress, according to these rules notarial decisions (as for example a certification of a
last will) are reviewable by the courts, without respect to the fact that the relevant
State Council regulations (Regulations on Notaries) do not contain such a provision.
18 According  to  Chinese  law  these  decisions  or  concrete  administrative  actions  are
possible  objects  of  judicial  review,  and concern the  possible  conflicts  in  which  the
courts may play a role. Since these types of decisions are all related to property rights
(caichanquan) and personal rights (renshenquan), other conflicts between citizens and
government agencies—not related either to renshenquan nor to caichanquan—cannot be
reviewed by the courts. 
19 In order to find where the courts cannot play any role in conflicts between society and
government one only has to look into the second chapter of the Chinese constitution
which deals  with “Fundamental  Rights and Duties of  Citizens”,  and to compare the
rights  mentioned  there  with  the  enumerations  in  the  ALL.  One  will  find  that
interference of governmental agencies in the freedom of speech, assembly, publication,
association, demonstration and of religious belief as well as in the right to work or the
right to get an education are not covered by the shouan fanwei (jurisdiction) of the ALL.
20 Since the promulgation of this law efforts have been undertaken to make xingzheng
susong more relevant to actual conflict resolution, either by clarifying the statutory
scope of jurisdiction or by extending the category of persons being capable of becoming
a plaintiff and of organisations capable of becoming a defendant. 
21 In its Opinion (Yijian) of 1991 Concerning the Execution of the ALL, the Supreme Court
made clear that certain police decisions the courts had been reluctant to accept, such
as “detention for investigation” (shourong shencha) and “re-education through labour”
(laodong jiaoyang) as well as decisions of the birth-planning administration are covered
by the jurisdiction clause of the ALL. These Supreme Court Opinions further clarified
that  decisions  of  the  land  administration  concerning  property  rights  in  land  and
mineral resources are open to review by the courts.
22 Through  its  1999  Interpretations  of  the  ALL,  the  Supreme  Court  has  continued  to
increase the relevance of administrative litigation by defining the capacity both of the
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plaintiff and the defendant. According to the ALL a person has standing to enter an
action against an administrative agency as long as he or she claims that the concrete
administrative act of this agency “qinfan qi hefa quanyi”, “infringed his lawful rights and
interests”  (art.  2).  The  Supreme  Court  clarifies  in  its  Interpretation  that  also  such
persons  have  standing  who  have  “a  legal  interest”  (falüshang  de  lihaiguanxi)  in  a
concrete  administrative  act  not  immediately  directed  against  them.  This  is,  for
example,  relevant  for  neighbouring  rights  (xianglinquan)  and  for  the  right  to  fair
competition  (gongping  jingzhengquan).  Concerning  the  latter  one,  a  court  in  Fujian
province recently decided a case in which the plaintiff sued a city government because
it  instructed  a  corporation  (owned  by  the  city)  to  allocate  certain  raw  materials
preferentially to certain factories. The court held the opinion that this kind of business-
promotion violated the principle of fair competition and thus the plaintiff’s right of
business autonomy (jingying zizhuquan).5
23 On the other side, the 1999 Interpretation also clarifies the question of who can become
a defendant in administrative litigation.  According to  the ALL the defendant is  the
xingzheng  jiguan,  the  administrative  agency  which  has  made  the  concrete
administrative act. For a long time it was held that schools and universities cannot be
qualified as “xingzheng jiguan”. A judgment of a court in the district of Haidian in Peking
came to  a  new understanding,  and regarded a  university  as  a  proper  defendant  in
administrative  litigation.  I  quote  from  this  judgment6:  “In  the  present  situation  in
China  the  law  confers  to  certain  institutions  (shiye  danwei)  and  social  associations
(shehui tuanti), although they do not qualify as xingzheng jiguan, the right to exercise
certain  administrative  competences.  Appeals  concerning  conflicts  resulting  from
exercising administrative functions are of an administrative and not of a civil nature.
Even if the ALL calls xingzheng jiguan as defendants it serves to resolve social conflicts
and to maintain social stability when such shiye danwei come to have the capacity to
become defendants in administrative litigation.” This judgment was incorporated into
the Supreme Court Interpretation of 1999 and thus became generally applicable law.
24 Lower  courts  have  even  attempted  to  break  through  the  statutory  framework  of
jurisdiction in order to protect rights which are neither renshenquan nor caichanquan. In
1997 an intermediate court in Fujian decided a case in which a middle-school teacher
appealed against  the request  of  the personnel  office  (renshiju)  of  a  city  to  cancel  a
decision to prematurely retire and re-employ him. The court considered this decision
to be in violation of the plaintiff’s constitutional right to work (laodongquan) and held
that it was itself authorised to review this decision.
25 A similar case, very problematic in terms of whether the court has jurisdiction, is that
of a handicapped student suing a commercial school for infringement of his right to
receive an education7: the plaintiff, handicapped by polio, participated in the entrance
examinations for vocational schools in Henan. Although he received higher marks than
needed  for  entering  the  school  of  his  choice,  he  was  not  accepted  because  of  his
physical condition. The plaintiff, claiming that this was a violation of his right to an
education as  provided for  in  the Handicapped Persons’  Protection Law,  brought  an
administrative law suit requesting the court to reverse the school’s decision. After the
court had accepted the case, the school voluntarily reversed its decision and accepted
the plaintiff as a student.
Main types of conflict
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26 Let us look now in a more systematic way at the types of conflict which actually are of
concern to the administrative tribunals of the courts.
27 When the ALL was drafted in the second half of the eighties the discussion about the
need  for  such  a  law  concentrated  mainly  on  three  areas  of  widespread  conflict:
conflicts concerning administrative sanctions such as fines, detention and revocation
of permits; conflicts concerning local cadres at will interfering with agricultural take-
over contracts, collecting fees and assigning work; and thirdly conflicts regarding the
denial of business operating licences or the slow treatment of applications.
28 Still  today these three areas of conflict represent a great deal of the administrative
cases pending in the Chinese courts. Of the roughly 87,000 cases the courts had to deal
with in 2000 the share of public security and land administration was about 15% each,
followed  by  city  planning  (10%),  industry  and  commerce  administration,  tax
administration (3% to 4%), and birth planning and health administration about 2%.8 
29 Unfortunately,  the  statistics  available  from  Chinese  publications  only  indicate  the
origin of the disputed administrative act, they say nothing about the legal nature of
these acts. However, it is clear that the overwhelming majority of administrative acts in
question are still administrative sanctions. This is reflected by the cases collected in the
Renmin fayuan anli xuan series (Selected Cases from the People’s Courts), edited by the
research office of the Supreme Court since 1992. Looking only to the cases collected in
the twelve volumes (27 to 38) for the last three years (1999 to 2001), we find that from
the 153 cases more than 30% concern administrative sanctions9, about 12% are related
to land and property rights, and about 10% relate to the neglect of properly exercising
statutory  duties  as  protecting  personal  or  property  rights  or  issuing  licences  or
permits, as denials of business operating licences and even the refusal to issue a permit
to travel abroad. Next follow cases concerning infringement of the statutory business-
autonomy  of  industrial  enterprises  or  agricultural  take-over  contracts.  Other  cases
refer to the request of administrative agencies to fulfil obligations which have no basis
in law, e.g. an incorrect tax assessment or compelling peasants to make payments not
required by law.
30 Throughout  the  1990s10 the  courts,  in  dealing  with  administrative  cases,  have
reinforced their function of helping to stabilise the economic reforms by consequently
reviewing cases concerning infringements of business-autonomy. In other words, the
courts rejected infringements by administrative agencies, mostly the Gongshang guanliju
(Agency for the Administration of Industry and Commerce), of the rights of enterprises
to make decisions on production, management, investment, marketing, etc. By their
review work the courts claim to be assisting the large and medium state enterprises in
transforming their “business mechanism”, in other words, in helping them to adjust to
market behaviour. 
31 The  courts  further  contributed  to  strengthening  market  structures  by  stopping
behaviours like establishing cartels (luan she ka) or arbitrary imposing of fines and fees
(luan fakuan, luan shoufei) on enterprises. In 1994, the Agency for the Administration of
Industry and Commerce of Qingdao lost a suit to 472 geti gongshanghu—plaintiffs who
fought  successfully  against  the  decision  of  the  gongshangju to  strip  them  of  their
business licences (jingying zhizhao)11.
32 Since the mid-1990s, cases concerning city construction or city planning have grown
strongly. Also, cases concerning arbitrary infringement of personal freedoms through
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administrative detention, detention for interrogation and re-education through labour
are growing in number by an average of 10% to 20% annually.
33 Recently, cases concerning social insurance payments and minimum living fees have
become more prominent12. 
34 More spectacular,  however,  are cases concerning the relationship between students
and colleges as well as between teachers and school administrations. Here, attempts are
being made to overcome the limits of the jurisdiction clause of art. 11 of the ALL, as I
illustrated by the cases of the teacher and of the handicapped student.
35 A special kind of litigation relates to administrative torts based on the State Liability
Law (guojia  peichang  fa)  of  1994.  Plaintiffs  who suffer  harm as  a  result  of  improper
administrative actions have the right to claim compensation in tort. If  damages are
awarded,  they  are  to  be  paid  from  the  public  funds  of  the  administrative  organs
involved, possibly these organs can seek indemnification from the official at fault if he
acted  by  intention  or  with  gross  negligence.  The  State  Liability  Law  adds  to  the
authority of the courts over administration organs. Many cases aim at compensation
because of illegal “detention for investigation” or “re-education through labour”, at an
illegal  revocation  of  a  licence  or  an  order  to  suspend  production,  at  illegal
infringements of business autonomy or at compensating damages suffered because an
agency did not fulfil its statutory duty to protect the property or personal rights of a
plaintiff. So, for instance, in May 1998 a Shanghai court compensated the bereaved of a
person in  police  custody (zhi’an  juliu)  who died  through illness  because  he did  not
receive medical treatment in due time.13 The compensation paid in administrative torts
cases grew from 24 million yuan in 1992 to 170 million yuan in 1994. Although this
seems to reflect a healthy development of the courts’ control function, there are many
problems with the execution of the State Liability Law, as I will show later on.
36 Whereas we can say concerning illegal (weifa) actions of administrative agencies that
the State Liability Law makes available a legal system for attaining compensation, this
is not the case when damage has been caused by an agency acting legally. How to deal,
for instance, with the damages suffered by peasants and enterprises in the Jiujiang area
when, during the 1998 Changjiang flood disaster the government decided to drain off
the water, they had to accept the flooding of villages and small towns “in order to save
Wuhan”? The State Liability Law does not apply. It also does not apply in a case where a
city government, emphasising aims of environmental protection, decided under a new
local  regulation  (difangxing  fagui) to  close  and  afforest  a  quarry  in  which  several
companies  had  been  awarded  long-term  exploitation  licences  by  the  city.
Compensating damages caused by this kind of non-illegal act is an open question. Some
authors suggest supplementing the State Liability Law accordingly, while others are
more in line with legal doctrine when requesting the promulgation of an extra State
Compensation Law (guojia buchang fa).
Problems and achievements
37 To summarise the problems and achievements of the courts in dealing with citizen-
government-disputes:
38 The Chinese novelist Ha Jin has the protagonist of his novel In the Pond (1998) express
his hope, that “though it was said that under heaven all crows are black, there had to
be a  place  where he could let  out  his  discontent  and find justice.”  Do the Chinese
People’s Courts provide this role the man “in the pond” is dreaming of?
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39 That the courts in the whole country during the last three years dealt with only 80,000
to 90,000 cases annually14 seems sufficient to justify the conclusion that administrative
litigation as a legal  instrument to provide judicial  relief  is  not very successful.  The
reasons are manifold. First, there are the three “being afraids” (sange pa): Citizens and
firms do not dare to sue, because they are afraid of retaliation by the agency sued;
agencies are not willing to become defendants because they are afraid to lose authority,
and courts hesitate to accept cases because they are afraid to spoil their relations with
the  government.  These  fears  have  their  roots  not  so  much  in  any  old-fashioned
psychology inherited from the past,  but in the Chinese constitution which does not
accept a separation of power. The courts are therefore not only not independent from
the  executive  but  in  practice  very  dependent,  because  they  are  funded  by  the
government  at  the  respective  level  and  not  directly  by  the  central  budget  of  the
Supreme Court or the Ministry of Justice.
40 Secondly,  more  concrete  problems  of  administrative  litigation  have  to  do  with  its
normative  structure  as  such.  For  instance,  the  problem  of  distinguishing  between
concrete  administrative acts  which are  reviewable  and abstract  administrative  acts
which are not. This often means an escape for administrative agencies: they use the
form of an abstract act, which in fact is directed to an ascertainable group of persons,
therefore  in  substance  a  concrete  act;  however,  courts,  looking  to  the  form,  are
reluctant to accept such cases. Here lies the main reason why the courts play only a
very weak role in one of the most urgent problems in the countryside: the tax-burden
of the peasants. Cases are rare because the local governments impose taxes or assign
works (tanpai) on the basis of legal documents which the courts regard as “abstract
administrative acts”, and therefore do not accept any lawsuits in these matters. 
41 This problem also has to do with the insufficiency of substantial administrative law.
The nature of the concrete administrative act has not been defined by law. There is no
clear understanding of what could be defined as a general order (Allgemeinverfügung),
which could be sued in court, and a normative act against which an action could not be
brought. This in turn is related to legal doctrine which has not yet elaborated reliable
criteria  to  differentiate  concrete  administrative  acts  on  the  one  hand,  generally
binding acts, internal acts, and acts of a non-compulsory nature on the other.
42 The main defect in dealing with administrative tort cases is also due to the normative
structure of the relevant law. According to the State Liability Law (see also § 67 II ALL)
compensation claims must first be arbitrated by the administrative authority and only
then can they be taken to court. This is contrary to most other administrative cases
(and of course any civil claim for compensation) which can be taken straight to court. 
43 Considering the results of administrative litigation we come across another problem.
During the 1990s the tendency that the plaintiffs withdraw the lawsuit became more
and  more  obvious.  Roughly  spoken,  30%  of  the  judgments  maintained  the
administrative decision, in 15% it was revoked, and about half of lawsuits had been
withdrawn by the plaintiff and in some years even up to 60% did so. The reasons for
this  may  be  a  change  of  mind  in  the  person  of  the  plaintiff,  pressure  and  even
intimidation by the defendant, suggestion of the court in order to please the defendant,
but also the strategy of a plaintiff himself to bring a suit with the implied intention to
induce  the  defendant  to  agree  to  an  out-of-court  settlement.  Siliao or  “private
settlements”  of  administrative  disputes  seem  to  be  very  common.  They  are  often
perceived as more favourable for the plaintiff, since the conflict may be settled fast
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and, above all, the plaintiff may spare a good deal of trouble with the agency in the
future.
44 All these shortcomings and preferences should, however, not lead to the conclusion
that the role of the courts in settling administrative conflicts can be ignored. In the
contrary, in spite of all obstacles, this role has become more prominent during the last
few years. Some Chinese research undertaken two years ago in Jiangsu15 found that the
influence of the courts became more important in the difficult field of birth planning.
Litigation here relates mostly to administrative penalties imposed without legal basis
or ignoring any legal procedure. The courts have restrained the arbitrary application of
excessive  fines,  interference  in  personal  freedom,  confiscation  of  property  and  of
completely extra-legal sanctions like the brutal demolishing of the houses of couples
having violated birth-control regulations. Besides sanctions, the refusal to issue a “One-
Child-Certificate”  (dusheng  zi-nü  zheng)  became  an  object  in  birth-planning  related
litigation.
45 Concerning the protection of the autonomy of business management the courts have
continuously  quashed decisions  of  local  governments  interfering in  the  freedom of
contract, in the rights of enterprises to market their products, to decide about their
investments, to fuse with other enterprises or to hire or keep their managers. Here and
in other citizen-government relations xingzheng susong has proved to be an effective
instrument  in  providing  judicial  relief  to  citizens  and  enterprises.  With  the
improvement of  the quality  of  the court  personnel  the further development of  the
scope of jurisdiction, a stronger estimation of judicial independence by the government
and finally by constitutional reforms which will be a main task of the next decade, the
institution  of  judicial  review  of  administrative  action  will  gradually  consolidate.
Besides this, the role of the court is not only reflected by actual treatment of cases but
also by the influence they extend to the work of administrative agencies because of the
sheer possibility that “min gao guan you men”,  “the citizens may get a place to find
justice”. Therefore it is sometimes mentioned in Chinese studies that administrative
litigation happens more often in underdeveloped areas (like Henan and Xibu), whereas
in more advanced areas administrative agencies have become more used to doing their
work according to law. The days seem to be over when the law was perceived only as a
means to control the people. Although it is time to conclude that what actually has
been achieved is something of a drop in the bucket, nevertheless the courts are looked
at more and more as the citizens’ most necessary and most likely protectors.
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